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ACCESSING KNOWLEDGE IN A DISCONTINUOUS WORLD.
A BRIEF COMMENT FROM SOUTHERN CHILE1
// MARCELO I. GONZÁLEZ GÁLVEZ
// 1 This paper was written as part of the FONDECYT postdoctoral research project 
Nº3130415, entitled: ‘El mundo, la realidad y el conocimiento: la versión de los mapuches’. 
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I would like to know what it is to be a Mapuche’, I told Juan, one of the most prominent elders in Elicura, try-
ing to explain to him the purpose of my doctoral research. 
Elicura is a small valley in southern Chile, where I car-
ried out fieldwork between September 2009 and October 
2010. It is inhabited by approximately 1,500 people, of 
which half are self-declared Mapuche, the most numer-
ous indigenous people in Chile. As Juan was listening 
to my claim, he looked at me puzzled, and after a few 
moments he smiled and replied: ‘That’s impossible! You 
cannot know what it is to be a Mapuche. […] The only 
way to know what is to be a Mapuche is to be one, so to 
know it you would have to be born again! [This time as 
a Mapuche]’ Disappointed by Juan’s reaction, I did not 
fully comprehend the depth of his assertion until a few 
months later. When Juan claimed the impossibility of my 
ethnographic effort, he did not intend to be rude or un-
supportive, as he also did not point out that I could not 
know what is to be a Mapuche because I was an outsider 
who, additionally, was not a Mapuche ‘racially speaking’. 
Rather, as I understood later, he was implicitly maintain-
ing a twofold principle that is obvious for most rural Ma-
puche people I have met, and which might be explained 
as follows.
Firstly, Mapuche people usually uphold that any meaning 
of anything, even of what the term ‘Mapuche’ means, is 
deeply personal. This is regardless of those aspects one 
may externally and prima facie assess as ‘evidently’ col-
lective. Thus, for instance, although there might be a col-
lective of people one might externally label as ‘the Ma-
puche’, it is expected that what it is to be a Mapuche for 
each one of its members would be something radically 
different (Similarly, each personal perspective on the na-
ture of this so-called ‘Mapuche collective’ would be dif-
ferent for those who comprise it). Although Juan thought 
I could not know what it is to be a Mapuche because I was 
not what he considered Mapuche people to be; for him, 
additionally, there was not even a tiny possibility that I 
could know what is to be Mapuche to his view. Although 
one could make up one’s own mind about certain things 
given certain circumstances, any possibility of knowing 
what is on other peoples’ minds seems, for the Mapuche, 
to be simply beyond discussion. This issue has several 
practical implications in Mapuche rural life, and it may 
be observed in a strong reluctance to give advice, or in 
the ubiquitous doubt people maintain towards what is re-
ally meant by other peoples’ words (see González Gálvez 
2012).
Secondly, and intimately connected to the former state-
ment, by denying to me the possibility of understanding 
the other, Juan was simultaneously sharing with me one 
of the key principles of what can be loosely labelled as a 
‘Mapuche philosophy’. Although this principle may be 
very simple, its implications are enormous (as we will 
see later), and exceed by far the small aspect I address in 
this paper. In short, the principle states that the only way 
of really knowing about something is by experiencing that 
something yourself. It was also due to this principle that 
Juan was actually one of the most renowned people in 
Elicura. It is common among the Mapuche, as elsewhere, 
to assert that some people ‘know’ more than others. How-
ever, in Mapuche life this cumulative and quantifiable 
conception of ‘knowledge’ is conceived of as inextricable 
from the several first-hand experiences that people have 
had in life. Thence, it is generally supposed that the older 
the person, the more experience he has had, and the more 
‘knowledge’ he has accumulated. This was the reason for 
Juan’s fame: it was simply because he was one of the old-
est people living in Elicura. 
In this paper I intend to problematize the idea of ‘access-
ing knowledge’, considering my ethnographic experience 
among the Mapuche people of southern Chile. Drawing 
on the aforementioned principle underlining the relevance 
of personal experience, I will attempt a twofold comment. 
The first comment refers to the ‘world’ which knowledge 
makes reference to, which involves confronting two pos-
sible understandings: the one implicit in the project ‘La 
mia cura’,2 and the one summarised in asserting that the 
only way of knowing what it is to be a Mapuche is by ‘be-
ing one’. The second comment refers to the potential that 
any knowledge has to be shared and/or accessed, which 
eventually involves challenging many assumptions that 
the idea of knowledge often implies (e.g. an intersubjec-
tive ethos). This latter comment will eventually lead us to 
deal with the problematic relationship between ontology 
and epistemology, which, as I argue, ultimately reclaims 
an always-contingent ethnographic solution. 
THE WORLD
Since I first planned writing this piece, I wondered what 
my friend Juan would think about the project ‘La mia 
cura’. In case the reader is not acquainted with it, in brief, 
this is a project carried out by Salvatore Iaconesi, an Ital-
ian artist who suffers from a brain tumour. Considering 
this, he has uploaded all his medical records to a free-
access website, intending to share them with everybody. 
Through this, Salvatore aims to find a cure to his illness, 
which he expects to be suggested by any, some, or many 
of this ‘everybody’ looking at his files. A few times I have 
thought that perhaps Juan would dare to give Salvatore 
one possible cure, suggesting that he should take a plane 
to Chile in order to visit the powerful evangelical prophet 
who cured his wife from what she described as a ‘stomach 
cancer’. Nevertheless, I am more inclined to think that 
Juan would not do that. This is not because Juan would 
not feel empathy for Salvatore’s suffering. It is simply 
because, regardless of any compassion Salvatore’s case 
may awake in Juan, he would probably think it extremely 
odd to find out what is good for oneself through another 
person’s experiences. ‘How can a person, who is not even 
related to him, know what is good for him?’, Juan would 
probably ask. And, perhaps, Salvatore would answer: 
‘
2 Inspirational piece for this issue of The Unfamiliar. See http://
www.artisopensource.net/cure/
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‘because in the past he might have had the same illness I 
am now experiencing’.
In this fictional conversation lies the core of the point I 
want to put forward. I have the strong impression that 
what might be at stake here is an equivocation (sensu 
Viveiros de Castro 2004), involving two superficially 
similar references, which point to two extremely different 
referents. Supporting both Salvatore’s and Juan’s allocu-
tions, we may discern two different premises responding, 
eventually, to two mutually incommensurate understand-
ings of ‘the world’ (sensu Merleau-Ponty 2004). On the 
one hand, we have Salvatore’s premise, which assumes 
(considering certain nuances) that there exists an over-
arching category (we can call it ‘humanity’) that is set out 
in an immutable setting (‘the world’, ‘reality’), which is 
beyond human agency. It is nothing but this assumption 
that explains why it is worth sharing his medical records 
and why it is worth listening to other people’s solutions: 
for Salvatore there is a given continuity (i.e. human biol-
ogy) allowing the recurrence of certain phenomena (e.g. 
cancer), and because of this continuity it is possible to 
replicate certain ways of action (e.g. treatments) in order 
to obtain the expected results (i.e. a cure). Even though 
each human being is considered to be unique in a psycho-
logical sense, in this understanding there is a biological 
connection that brings them all together, allowing them to 
have the ‘same’ diseases and treatments. 
On the other hand, we have the premise supporting the 
claim which, I suppose, Juan would make. In his view, 
contrary to Salvatore’s, there is not a given continu-
ity between different human beings (at best, this conti-
nuity must be created [González Gálvez 2012]) in the 
same way as there is not a transcendental unity inherent 
in ‘the world’ to be experienced. If, in Salvatore’s case, 
there is an implicit subject/object dualism, which allows 
subjects to replicate their equivalent experiences of the 
same objects, in Juan’s case such a dualism cannot even 
be claimed to exist (because subjects and objects do not 
belong a priori to ‘the same’ categories). Considering 
this, we can have a better grasp of the reasons behind 
Juan’s assertion of the impossibility of acquiring certain 
knowledge (e.g. the meaning of being Mapuche): because 
to his view what may be labelled as ‘world’ and ‘human-
ity’ are discontinuous categories. What this discontinuity 
implies, fundamentally, is a denial of any given possibil-
ity of phenomenological replication. There is no reason 
to suppose one person is perceptively and substantially 
equivalent to another, and thus there is no reason to sur-
mise that their personal experiences might be replicable 
by others. That is exactly why, to know something, each 
person must personally experience that something.
One immediate problem emerging from such a stance re-
gards the notion of what so far I have called ‘the world’. 
In Salvatore’s case, due to its immutability, ‘the world’ 
appears to be frozen in ceteris paribus (‘cancer’, ‘hu-
manity’, and ‘cure’ are concepts which are part of this 
unitary world, insofar as they are essentially independent 
of people), but in Juan’s case the equation seems to go as 
follows: If the way we know what is ‘out there’ is by ex-
periencing it, and if experience is something fundamen-
tally personal, it is necessary to conclude that people do 
not inhabit one, but multiple worlds of experience. These 
multiple worlds lack, as might be expected, any neces-
sary unity, and if they sometimes overlap, this is more 
due to the similarity of the people experiencing their own 
worlds than to an intrinsic characteristic of ‘the world out 
there’. 
ACCESSING KNOWLEDGE
Once discussed, the ontological relativity to which 
‘knowing’ may be subdued, and taking seriously the path 
opened up by Juan, it seems that the questions one might 
ask regarding the subject of ‘accessing knowledge’ are 
very different from the ones one would ask if one takes, 
for example, a political approach. Indeed, following Juan, 
we are quite unexpectedly very far away from any sort of 
ethical discussion that argues against any form of restrict-
ing knowledge, and we are not even close to a celebration 
of any free access to it. Conversely, perhaps we may rec-
ognise ourselves discussing another dimension of topics, 
more related to defining knowledge in the first place. I 
think there are at least two critical, but interrelated, points 
in this sense. The first is related to challenging the social 
nature of knowledge, whereas the second refers to a de-
nial of its potential for institutionalisation. 
The first thing Juan’s premise allows us is to challenge 
the notion of knowledge as an artefact, which may be 
traded and exchanged within social life. Even though – 
for Juan – knowledge is something one possesses, it is 
not something one immediately could share, due to the 
strict personal nature of that knowledge. As stated above, 
in Juan’s view what is known and what is not known is 
entirely up to a person, in its pure singularity. This notion 
brings out two subjects immediately: 1) a veil of incer-
titude regarding the ways (if any) that Mapuche people 
consider it possible to ‘transmit knowledge’3; and 2) the 
implications of thinking about knowledge not only as de-
tached from its ‘social nature’, but also unleashed from 
the constraints imposed by thinking about it as a ‘social 
artefact’. It is on this second subject that I want to focus 
my attention. 
As stated before, thinking about ‘the world’ as some-
thing dependent upon each singular person posits a prob-
lem concerning the way we might think about accessing 
knowledge. It does not only challenge any preconceived 
idea of what constitutes knowledge, but it asks for a re-
3 Eventually most knowledge can be partially transmitted if one 
follows certain ways of action, but this is a subject I deliber-
ately chose to leave out of this argument in order to emphasise 
the discontinuity of the Mapuche way of thinking about ‘the 
world’. If the reader is interested, these ways are described in 
González Gálvez (2012).
M
. G
o
n
zález G
álv
ez
The Unfamiliar 39http://journals.ed.ac.uk/unfamiliar/ ISSN: 2050-778X
conceptualization of the ways we think one may access 
any knowledge. If people cannot necessarily replicate 
other people’s personal experiences, and if one cannot re-
ally learn anything from others (the only way of really 
knowing about something is experiencing that something 
yourself), any access to knowledge seems to be limited 
to each personal engagement with ‘the world’. In a literal 
sense, accessing knowledge appears freed from any social 
mediation, and seems to be entirely up to each personal 
agency. Knowledge is, thus, no longer a social artefact, 
but an inalienable personal possession resulting from an 
open-ended personal experience. 
Perhaps the most relevant outcome of this ‘new’ and aso-
cial notion of knowledge is that it resists the key problem 
of free access to knowledge: its institutionalisation. To 
consider knowledge as a social artefact, which may be 
exchanged and transmitted, is what eventually makes it 
something to be restricted, valued, and commoditised. 
On the contrary, if we take knowledge to be an intimate 
and personal possession, any possible restriction or com-
modification of it seems nothing but absurd. Why would 
somebody want to restrict access to something that can-
not be un-restricted? (i.e. other people’s knowledge-s). 
Why would somebody commodify something that only 
has value for the only person able to commodify it? Con-
sequently, accessing knowledge is no longer a social 
problem but an epistemological one. Thus, we would not 
have to worry about the dilemmas involving the dissemi-
nation of social knowledge, and instead should introspec-
tively consider our own personal potential to know what 
is good/bad for us in worlds that are entirely dependent 
upon that personal potential.
CONCLUSION
To conclude this brief set of comments I would like to 
clarify that it is not my intention to criticise the proj-
ect ‘La mia cura’, which, regardless of what I seem to 
put forward in this paper, I find truly remarkable and in 
many ways admirable. To have employed it here is only 
for the sake of making a point I think of as crucial when 
approaching the subject of accessing knowledge from 
an anthropological perspective. Put simply, before deal-
ing with a subject we must avoid taking any part of that 
subject for granted. If you want, before asking questions 
about the benefits or difficulties posited by the problem 
of accessing knowledge nowadays, it is compulsory (at 
least if one wants to keep equivocations [sensu Viveiros 
de Castro 2004] to a minimum) first to comprehend what 
is to be understood as knowledge and the means one may 
use to access it. In this sense, it seems that we should 
be constantly reviewing the relationship between ontol-
ogy (what things are) and epistemology (the means em-
ployed to understand what things are). I sincerely think 
this relationship should be conceived as an open-ended 
mutual determination, which considers none of the terms 
involved as final and essentially established, but in a con-
tinual motion of being determined by, and simultaneously 
determining, the other. This implies denying the existence 
of an ultimate ontology and of a concurrent privileged 
epistemology in order to access this ontology. And, on the 
contrary, recognising the existence of multiple ontologies, 
which may be accessed and reproduced only by their own 
particular epistemologies. Denying the existence of one 
unitary and definitive ontology is nothing but breaking 
a continuity that we may see in ‘the world’, but which is 
not necessarily in ‘the world’. Once ‘the world’ appears 
as discontinuous, we are thus forced to look at each pos-
sible ontology-epistemology relationship in particular, 
avoiding the imposition of our own terms on others.
This takes us, finally, to reflect about the fundamental 
place ethnography should enjoy, not only as a research 
method, but also as a means of creating relational bridges 
between the discontinuities of ‘the world’. It is only by a 
deep and committed engagement between people that one 
may partially figure out other ontology-epistemology rela-
tionships. In anthropology, it is perhaps Martin Holbraad 
(2009) who lately has been most clearly maintaining this 
kind of stance, dismissing the classical representational 
approach (which assumes a natural continuity bringing 
together different cultures) in order to take one what he 
labels as ‘ontographic’. Following this paper’s subject, 
this implies that anthropology should not be about ask-
ing why Juan believes those things about knowledge, but 
what knowledge is in his view. However, it must be clear 
that none of these claims should be understood as defini-
tive. If ontologies and epistemologies are always contin-
gent, there is no problem at all if Salvatore looks for a 
cure employing whichever means he wants, as long as 
that means are coherent with the ontology he maintains. 
A problem would only arise if one assumed that the same 
methods and ontological assumptions are valid for every-
one, including Juan, without even asking them if they are 
in agreement with that supposition.
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